Obtaining the state of the art performance of deep learning models imposes a high cost to model generators, due to the tedious data preparation and the substantial processing requirements. To protect the model from unauthorized re-distribution, watermarking approaches have been introduced in the past couple of years. e watermark allows the legitimate owner to detect copyright violations of their model. We investigate the robustness and reliability of state-of-the-art deep neural network watermarking schemes. We focus on backdoor-based watermarking and show that an adversary can remove the watermark fully by just relying on public data and without any access to the model's sensitive information such as the training data set, the trigger set or the model parameters. We as well prove the security inadequacy of the backdoor-based watermarking in keeping the watermark hidden by proposing an a ack that detects whether a model contains a watermark.
INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks(DNNs) have been successfully deployed in various applications; ranging from speech [14, 17, 19] and image [18, 22, 35] recognition to natural language processing [2, 12, 13, 36] and more. e task of generating a model in deep neural network is computationally expensive and also requires a considerable amount of training data that has undergone a thorough process of preparation and labelling. e task of data cleaning is known to be the most time consuming task in data science [32] . According to the 2016 data science report, conducted by CrowdFlower, provider of a "data enrichment" platform for data scientists, reveals that data scientists spend around 80% of their time on just preparing and managing data for analysis [9] . is enormous investment on preparing the data and training a model on it is however at an immediate risk, since the model can be easily copied and redistributed once sold. To protect the model from unauthorized re-distribution, watermarking approaches have been introduced, inspired by wide deployment of watermarks in multimedia [23, 34, 37] to provide copyright protection. Watermarking approaches for DNNs lie in two broad categories: white-box and black-box watermarking. Black-box watermarking does not su er from the application limitations of whitebox watermarking; as in the former veri cation only requires API access to the plagiarized service to verify the ownership of the deep learning model, while the la er requires model owners to access all the parameters of models in order to extract the watermark. Furthermore, black-box watermarking is advantageous over white-box watermarking as it is more likely to be resilient against statistical a acks [38] . In this work 1 , we investigate recent black-box watermarking approaches proposed in [1, 16, 44] , these approaches each introduce a(some) variant(s) of backdoor-based watermarking to protect model ownership. Backdoors or neural trojans, [7, 15, 26] , originally are the terms for a class of a acks against the security of deep learning when an entity outsources the learning for model computation to another untrusted but resourceful party. e party can train a model that performs well on the requested task, while its embedded backdoors lead to targeted misclassi cations when encountering a particular trigger in the input. e idea of "turning weakness to a strength" [1] , launched a new line of work suggesting using backdoors for ownership protection( [1, 16, 44] ). e motivation behind the research on this topic is to use the trigger to embed a "signature" of the model owner, as shown in Fig. 1 . Figure 1 : A schematic illustration of the backdoor-based watermarking in neural networks e trigger in the input can take one of the following forms: embedded content representing a logo of the owner( [44] and [16] ), a pre-de ned noise pa ern in the inputs( [44] ) or a set of particular inputs acting as a secret "key" set( [44] and [1] ). We investigate whether using backdoors in DNNs brings su cient "strength" for watermarking the models. We introduce two a acks(black-box and white-box) on the aforementioned backdoor-based watermarking schemes, and show that these watermarks are fully removable. Our a acks neither require any information of the original data and its corresponding ground truth labels utilized for training the watermarked model, nor need to have any information of the backdoor embedded in the model. Our work sheds more light on the problem of model stealing and insu ciency of the proposed solutions. Our results imply that, an a acker can steal a model that is trained by a resourceful party and remove the watermark without losing the models pro ciency or any need to undergo an extensive e ort of data preparation as the watermarked model has to endure.
Our Contributions-We propose three main contributions in this work: (i) We introduce our black-box a ack that removes the embedded watermark in backdoor-based watermarking scheme. Our a ack solely relies on publicly available information and successfully removes the watermark from the neural network without requiring any access to the network parameters, the backdoor embedded as the watermark, or the training data. (ii) We present a white-box a ack for scenarios that we are guaranteed access to the model parameters. Bene ting from the additional information, our white-box a ack o ers an optimized version of the black-box a ack, where the optimization both improves the model accuracy and signi cantly decreases the a ack's timing. (iii) We as well present our property inference a ack that fully distinguishes the watermarked neural networks from the unmarked ones. Our a ack breaks a security property of watermarked models by detecting the presence of watermarks in the models, and in combination with the proposed two a acks provides an a acker with a powerful tool to remove the the watermarks completely and e ciently.
Paper Organization-e rest of this paper is organized as follows: we review state-of-the-art watermarking schemes for DNNs and the proposed a acks on the schemes in Section 2. We provide formal de nitions for deep neural networks and backdoor-based watermarking in Section 3 in addition to describing the security vulnerability in the schemes. Subsequently in Section 4, we introduce the basic and optimized versions of our a ack that removes the watermark. We as well propose an a ack that detects the presence of a watermark in a given model. Finally in Section 5, we present the results of the experiments that con rm a successful watermark removal.
RELATED WORK
e rst watermarking framework for deep neural networks was introduced by Uchida et al. [40] . ey propose a white-box watermarking by embedding watermark into the parameters of the DNN model during the training process. Recently, by analyzing the statistical distribution of the model in [40] , Wang and Kerschbaum [38] presented an a ack that detects the watermark and removes it by overwriting. In another watermarking a empt in white-box se ing, DeepMarks [4] embeds a binary code-vector in the probabilistic distribution of the weights while preserving accuracy. However, in addition to being susceptible to statistical a acks, white-box watermarking methods [4, 29, 40] , might su er from application constraints.
ese methods presume access to all the model parameters, which is not guaranteed in all cases. e presumption prevents the model owner from claiming ownership of their stolen model, if the parameters of the redistributed model are not publicly available.
e demand in protecting neural networks that are solely accessible through a remote API, has made a tangible shi in DNN watermarking research as well [5] . DeepSigns framework [33] which embeds watermark in the probability density function of the activation set of the target layer, introduces two versions of the framework to provide watermarking in both white-box and black-box se ing. In two other approaches [6, 28] , the authors use adversarial examples in a zero-bit watermarking algorithm to enable extraction of the watermark without requiring model parameters.
is approach however, requires limitation on transferability of the utilized adversarial examples across other networks. Backdoor-based watermarking, proposed in [1, 16, 24, 30, 44] is another recent line of work that aims at watermarking DNN models in the black-box se ing. In this approach, a secret trigger set and its pre-de ned labels are fed to the model during training process. Relying on the model's ability to learn these arbitrary key pairs of triggers and their corresponding labels, the model owner can prove their ownership and protect the model's copyright.
Since backdooring a neural network may also impose other threats, identifying and removing them has gained a ention in research. However, typically such systems as presented in [8, 11, 27] are intended to be employed alongside the neural network in production. ey are tasked only to fend o a empts of actively using the embedded backdoor, which is not applicable for the scenario of a acking watermarking schemes because the trigger set is never released. On the other hand, there are few schemes [41] that does not require access to the trigger set at any time. ey rst detect whether a backdoor exists in the model by checking how many pixels in the input image should be modi ed for the prediction to change to another class. When there is one such consistent small modi cation for many benign inputs, it is assumed to be a backdoor and then the authors proceed to reverse-engineer and mitigate it.
is approach only works with backdoors that are restricted to a relatively small patch of the image. Nonetheless, we propose a acks that fully remove these embedded watermarks, which are inspired by model stealing a acks in DNNs. Recent works on stealing machine learning models via prediction APIs have shown that the current ML-as-a-service providers could enable a acks that extract the model and violate the training data privacy; Papernot et al. [31] exhibit this a ack on speci c models, Tamer et al. [39] exploit this vulnerability to target transferability of a speci c type of adversarial examples, and Juuti et al. [21] demonstrates how to ease the model extraction by proposing more e ective a acks. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one other model stealing a ack proposed to remove the watermark [20] . Authors in [20] propose evasion a acks which steals n models and answers the prediction queries with the class that receives the majority of votes from the stolen networks, resulting in watermark removal. However, in our work, we introduce a acks that break the security of proposed watermarking schemes without the need to access multiple models. We elaborate on how our a acks successfully remove the watermark while maintaining the accuracy of the models, a er describing backdoor-based watermarking schemes in details in the next section.
BACKDOOR-BASED WATERMARKING
e intuition in black-box watermarking is to explore the generalization and memorization capabilities of deep neural networks to learn the pa erns of an embedded trigger set and its pre-de ned label(s). e pairs of learned pa erns and their corresponding predictions will act as the keys for the ownership veri cation. Zhang et al. [44] investigate three watermark generation algorithms to generate di erent types of trigger sets for deep neural network models: (a) embedding meaningful content into the original training data, (b) embedding noise as watermarks into the protected DNNs, and (c) embedding irrelevant data samples. Guo and Potkonjak [16] as well, propose a content embedding approach for watermarking in DNNs. Moreover, similar to the third watermark generation algorithm in [44] , Adi et al. [1] suggest using the over-parameterization of neural networks to make a backdoor in it. Backdooring enables the operator to train a model that deliberately outputs speci c(incorrect) labels; authors in [1] use this property to design trigger sets to watermark the DNN. In what follows, we provide a formal denition for learning process in neural networks, we also formally describe backdoor-based watermarking in DNN and elaborate on the schemes introduced in [1, 16, 44] . We end the section by pointing out the security vulnerabilities of the schemes.
De nitions and Models
We follow the notations of [1] throughout this paper to introduce our a ack accordingly. In order to train a neural network, we initially require some objective ground-truth function f . e neural network consists of two algorithms: training and classi cation. In training, the network tries to learn the closest approximation of f . Later, during the classi cation phase the network utilizes this approximation to perform prediction on unseen data. Formally, Figure 2 : A high-level schematic illustration of the learning process the input to the neural network is represented by a set of binary strings: D ⊆ {0, 1} * , where |D| = Θ(2 n ), with n indicating the security parameter. e corresponding labels are represented by L ∈ {0, 1} * {⊥} and |L| = Ω(p(n)) for a positive polynomial p(.); with the symbol ⊥ showing the unde ned classi cation for a speci c input.
e ground-truth function f : D → L, assigns labels to inputs. Also, forD the set of inputs with de ned groundtruth labels,D = {x ∈ D| f (x) ⊥}, the algorithms' access to f is granted through an oracle O f . Hence, the learning process illustrated in Fig. 2 of [1] , consists of the following two algorithms:
that outputs a label M(x) ∈ L\{⊥} for each input x ∈ D e metric ϵ−accuracy evaluates the accuracy of the algorithm pair (Train, Classify). In an ϵ−accurate algorithm the following inequality holds: Pr [f (x) Classi f (M, x)|x ∈D] ≤ ϵ; the probability is taken over the randomness of Train, with the assumption that the ground-truth label is available for those inputs.
Backdoor-based Watermarking in DNNs
Backdooring teaches the machine learning model to output incorrect but valid labels
f (x) to a particular subset of inputs T ⊆ D, namely trigger set. e pair b = (T ,T L ) forms the backdoor for a model. A randomized algorithm called SampleBackdoor generates the backdoors b. SampleBackdoor needs access to the oracle O f and works closely with the original model. e complete backdooring process is illustrated in Fig.3 [1] . Formally presenting, backdoor(O f , b, M) is a PPT algorithm that on input oracle to f , the backdoor b and a model M, outputs a modelM. e backdoor modelM is required to output particular incorrect(regarding f ) labels for the inputs from the trigger set and correct ones for other inputs. In other words, the following two inequalities must always hold for a backdoored modelM: To watermark an ML model using the backdooring process, the algorithm MModel() is used. MModel consists of the following sub-algorithms:
Generates the original model on the training set, not that the trigger set is not included in training in this step. 
is the indicator function that evaluates to 1 if expr is true and 0 otherwise. Note that, as we skip the commitment details, the marking key mk in V eri f translates to the inputs x in the trigger set T , and the veri cation key k refers to the corresponding labels T L . Furthermore, the 1 |L | |T | comes from the assumption that the ground-truth label is unde ned for the inputs of the trigger set T , for which we assume the label is random. Hence, we assume that for any x ∈ T , we have
. As a result, it is expected that 1 |L | |T | of the inputs fall into the backdoor label "randomly". Hence, to verify the presence of the watermark in the model without a bias, we need to deduct this number from the classi cation result.
Backdoor-based Watermarking Schemes
Backdoor-based watermarking schemes exploit the property of over-parameterization in neural networks to embed backdoors in them. ey teach the network a trigger set and its pre-de ned (incorrect) labels that will act as the embedded keys for the ownership veri cation; it is necessary to note that the trigger set's labels deliberately do not match the output of the ground truth function used in the network training phase. We investigate the recent backdoorbased schemes in [1, 16, 44] . e watermark embedded in these schemes is one of the following three forms: Embedded Content, Pre-Speci ed Noise, and Abstract Images. a) Content Embedded(Logo): A visual marker(e.g. a text) is added to a set of inputs, namely the training watermark set, forming the owner's signature and embedded in the watermark modelM. e text and its location is xed for all the samples in the watermark set. en, these marked inputs are matched to a xed label. e watermarked model M, is expected to map any testing watermark set to that xed class. A testing watermark set, is a set of inputs that contains the same visual marker as the one embedded in M. is approach is used in both [16] and [44] . b) Pre-Speci ed Noise: is watermark is similar to the logo watermark in selection and classi cation process. e difference is what is added to the inputs is an instance of Gaussian noise. e noise pa ern is xed for all samples in the watermark set. is approach is one of the proposed watermarking schemes in [44] . Note that in both Pre-speci ed Noise and Content Embedded watermarking schemes, there is just one label that the whole watermark set is mapped to. c) Abstract Images: In this category of watermarking, a set of abstract images [1] , or images that are not from the same domain as the training data [44] is selected and labeled with pre-de ned classes. We continue with the Abstract Images approach in [1] . e are two main di erences between this watermarking and the previous two. First, the Abstract Images watermarking modelM, maps di erent subsets of the trigger set to di erent classes. Second, in Abstract Images, unlike the previous two scheme the watermark is not a pa ern that is applicable to any input. Here, watermark is a xed set of inputs and labels. Hence, the testing watermark set is exactly the same as the training watermark set.
Security of Backdoor-based Watermarking
We review the security claims in black-box watermarking as stated in [1, 16, 44] , and discuss how our a ack invalidates all the presented claims. (i) As stated in [44] , section 4: "A er embedding(the watermarks), the newly generated models are capable of ownership veri cation. Once they are stolen and deployed to o er AI service, owners can easily verify them by sending watermarks as inputs and checking the service's output." (ii) As well, authors in [1] claim that their proposed scheme is persistent in the sense that "It is hard to remove a backdoor, unless one has knowledge of the trigger set." However, our a ack shows that the watermark is successfully removable and to perform so, the a acker does not require any knowledge of the trigger set.
(iii) In addition to the security claims mentioned above, authors in [1] make another claim on backdoor-based approaches while de nes persistency. Here is the claim: "let f be a ground-truth function, b be a backdoor andM ← backdoor (O f , b, M) be an ϵ−accurate model. Assume an algorithm A on input O f ,M outputs an ϵ−accurate modelM in time t, which is at least (1 − ϵ) accurate on b. enÑ ← A(O f , N ) generated in the same time t, is also ϵ− accurate for any arbitrary model N ". e claim, however not supported with proofs, shows the impossibility of removing the watermark while guarantees full access to the ground-truth function and restricting the runtime of A. Authors in [1] state the claim is also true in case of giving A unlimited power to A, but restricting its access to the ground-truth function. Our a ack shows that this claim is not valid. In our model, A requires an equivalent runtime of training a network but zero access to the ground-truth function, and yet removes the watermark successfully while keeping the model ϵ−accurate. (iv) On a similar note to [1] , [16] claims that "transferring learning is on the same order of magnitude as the cost of training, if not higher. With that much resources and expertise at hand, an a acker would have built a model on their own." is claim clearly neglects the fact that the cost of data preparation for the original model is comparable with the cost of model generation itself, consequently the a acker saves a considerable amount by stealing the model through queries. (iv) [44] refer to the results of [39] to state that stealing a model using prediction APIs needs queries of signi cant size; e.g. 100k, where k is the number of model parameters in the particular example of two-layered neural network in [39] . ey conclude that as more complicated models with more parameters, e.g. 138M in VGG-16, the a ack would even need considerably more queries. Our experiments demonstrate that for a successful a ack on a network with more than a million of parameters, our a acker only needs to query the API for 20000-30000 times. (v) Furthermore, [1] describes their scheme to be functionality-preserving, providing unremovability, unforgeability and enforcing non-trivial ownership. We focus on the unremovability property that prevents an adversary from removing a watermark, even if s/he knows about the existence of a watermark and the used algorithm. e unremovability requires that for every PPT algorithm A the chance of winning the following game is negligible:
We propose a computationally bounded A which not only wins this security game, but also demands fewer requirements. e algorithm shown above is guaranteed access to the model and the groundtruth function. Our a ack however, only requires oracle access to the model(M) parameters, public inputsD from the domain and none of the rest. Subsequently, it removes the watermark while it preserves the functionality.
ATTACKS ON BACKDOOR-BASED WATERMARKING
We introduce a black-box and a white-box a ack on backdoor-based watermarking in DNNs. Our black-box a ack relies solely on the model's public information, mainly its query results. We also introduce our white-box a ack for scenarios that allow access to the model parameters. Our white-box a ack uses the model parameter information to speed up and optimize the black-box a ack. e goal of our a acks is not only showing that the chance of winning the unremovability game described in the previous section is not negligible, but also exhibiting that doing so is possible with considerably higher e cacy and less requirements than presented in the game. We claim "less requirements", since although the unremovability game permits the a acker algorithm A to know the watermarking algorithm as well as to query the ground truth function f , neither of our a acks takes advantage of accessing the oracle O f , nor they use any knowledge of the type of the watermarking algorithm, e.g. Embedded Content or Pre-speci ed Noise. e game as well, guarantees access to the model parameters by default. We however, use this information only in our white-box a ack. Our black-box a ack does not rely on any information of the model parameters to remove the watermark. In addition to less requirements, we claim "higher e cacy", as the unremovability game is labeled as won if the a acker A suggests a modelM, such that the model achieves a similar test accuracy as the watermarked modelM while: V eri f (mk, k,M) = 0. From the V eri f description in the previous section, the function outputs zero if the following holds:
meaning the number of inputs in the trigger set mapped byM to labels di erent than the pre-de ned labels exceeds a negligible fraction of the trigger set. We go beyond this condition, and introduce the full removal of the watermark, with the following two conditions:
L |T | ≤ ϵ |T | In full removal of the watermark, the a acker's proposed model M, still achieves a test accuracy very close to the watermarked modelM's. However, in this de nition, the number of inputs in the trigger set mapped byM to the corresponding pre-de ned labels does not exceed a random labels assignment's result by more than a negligible fraction of the trigger set. We apply our a acks to three di erent watermarking schemes introduced in [1, 16, 44] . In what follows we introduce our a acks and show how they perform on each watermarking scheme. We evaluate our a ack on MNIST and CIFAR-10 data sets.
Black-Box Attack
In our black-box a ack, we do not assume any access to the trigger set, the training data or the parameters of the watermarked model M. Our a ack solely relies on the publicized information. We query the watermarked modelM with inputD and use the query output as data labels, to train a derived model as illustrated in Fig. 4 . Note thatD is distinct from the watermarked modelM's training data D, but is from the same application domain. We show our a ack model through the following black-box, full watermark removal game. e OM in the game indicates the blackbox access toM through a prediction API. Figure 4 : A schematic illustration of our black-box attack
As the rst step in the black-box, full watermark removal game, MModel generates an original model M and forms the watermark modelM, by embedding backdoors b in it. It also generates the trigger set T and its corresponding labels T L . T can refer to a trigger set that is either used in the training phase or the testing phase, or a mixture of both. During the game, the a acker A is allowed to make queries toM to train its modelM. e nal step in the game is challenging the a acker A and evaluating if it can achieve the same accuracy as the original model, while removing the watermark fully.
White-Box Attack
e black-box a ack we proposed in the previous section, does not require any information about the model parameters. However, we show that if the a acker A is guaranteed access to the model parameters, as is the default assumption in the unremovability game in [1] , it can remove the watermark even more e ciently. We propose a white-box a ack that provides our black-box a ack with signi cant optimization. We show the white-box a ack model by the following white-box full watermark removal game.
L |T | ≤ ϵ |T | Similar to the black-box full watermark removal game, MModel generates an original M, the watermark modelM, the trigger set T and its corresponding labels T L . It allows the a acker A to accessM's parameters to train its modelM. en A is challenged to achieve the same accuracy as the original model, and remove the watermark fully. Our white-box a ack, illustrated in Fig. 5 , is inspired by the ne-pruning techniques introduced in [25] . It consists of the two following sub algorithms: regularization and ne-tuning.
(
e rst sub-algorithm A Re performs regularization onM. e input for both sub-algorithms isD, which is from the same domain as but distinct from D. e regularization algorithm adds a term Figure 5 : A schematic illustration of our white-box attack to the residual sum of squares in the loss function. Since the coe cients are chosen to minimize the loss function, this technique shrinks the coe cient estimates towards zero. e general goal of regularization is to discourage learning a more complex or exible model, and to prevent over ing [3] . In our a ack, A deploys A Re to remove the watermark fully. However, the achievement costs a slight reduction in test accuracy compared to the original model M. To compensate for this reduction, the output of A Re is then fed to A F ine to be ne-tuned on an unmarked training set. Fine-tuning is a strategy originally proposed in the context of transfer learning [42] , aiming to adapt a DNN trained for a particular task to perform a related one. Fine-tuning initializes training with the weights inM Re , and uses a small learning rate to generate the modelM with nal weights that are relatively close to the weights inM Re . Our results show thatM wins the white-box full watermark removal game described earlier; by satisfying both watermark removal and accuracy maintenance requirements. We emphasize that our white-box a ack does not require any information of the ground truth function or the trigger set for winning the game. Instead, it uses a random set of inputs from the domain and queries the modelM to label them.
Property Inference Attack
Property inference a acks [10] have been originally proposed to extract knowledge about training data given whitebox access to a neural network. We propose to use a property inference a ack to detect whether a backdooring-based watermark has been embedded in a neural network that is highly accurate on some task. If such an a ack were successful, this classi er could be used to check whether a watermark removal a ack is necessary and ultimately if the model stealing a ack has been successful. Moreover, this classi er could be hosted as a service by a third party to ease model stealing a acks. In our a ack, the a acker needs to have access to an oracle O f , the backdoor-based watermark embedding function MModel and has to be able to generate k su ciently di erent high-accuracy models for f . In the following part we present the watermark detection security game and subsequently describe and perform an exemplary property inference a ack on MNIST for all three described watermarking schemes where the a acker wins the watermark detection game. Given a modelM and an oracle O that correctly predicts whether a model is watermarked, the a acker wins if he can design a classi er M that agrees for the classi cation of a given model with O with a probability of at least 1 − ϵ. Figure 6 illustrates this watermark detection game. Formally, A wins the watermark detection game as following.
e cornerstone to the a ack is the property inference algorithm which extracts a set of labeled feature vectors from a non-watermarked model M and its watermarked counterpartM. e binary label denotes whether the feature vector was extracted from M orM. Given su ciently many training examples, the intuition is to generate a feature space that is clearly separable between the two classes. e feature extraction algorithm has access to the oracle O f so that even elaborate features such as benign mean activations could be included. We chose to implement a property inference a ack on MNIST as a demonstration that the a ack works. In the discussion we give an intuition on why the a ack should generally work for any other backdoor-based watermarking scheme. For MNIST, the feature vectors are generated simply by extracting weights and biases from the rst layer and computing the mean activation on benign input for each layer. is method is referred to as FeatureExtract(M, x) where M is the input model and x is part of the benign training data. Next, we introduce the function PIData which generates the training data by extracting features from the non-watermarked M and its watermarked counterpartM.
PIData():
4) Output F M , FM Each invocation of PIData requires that the a acker generates a new high-accuracy model on the task f . e actual a ack PIAttack generates training and testing data and stops training the binary classi erM once the testing accuracy is su ciently high.
PIAttack():
OutputM e property inference a ack serves as a model for future a acks that -given the exibility of the de nition, entails approaches like those presented in [41] . In the experiments section, we demonstrate that the presented watermarking schemes are vulnerable to the property inference a ack. We show this by executing the PIAttack algorithm to accurately classify watermarked models for MNIST.
EXPERIMENTS
We rst explain the experiment setup and evaluation metrics. en present our results of a acking various categories of backdoorbased watermarking, using our black-box and white-box algorithms. Subsequently we discuss that the results con rm our claim that our a acks can fully remove the watermarks. We should also mention that since we are simulating both the challenger and the a acker in our experiments and do not allow any overlap in their training dataset, our models e ectively have access to half of the training dataset. e limitation prevents our models from reaching their highest possible accuracy [43] . Despite the fact that our a acks reach their best performance when applied to original models with high accuracy, as we discuss in 5.3, they can still remove the embedded watermark successfully in our experiments. e results are publicly veri able with our code available at [blinded for review].
Experiment Setup
In the previous section, we introduced our a ack model through a full watermark removal game between a challenger MModel and the a acker A. We simulate both entities in this section and run experiments according to the algorithm descriptions in Section 4.
Original and Watermarked Model Generation-We rst simulate the MModel algorithm in our full watermark removal games to generate the original model M, the watermarked modelM, and the watermark consisting of the watermark test set T and its corresponding labels T L . e model M is trained over a portion of the training data with ground truth labels and we use the rest for testing. We capture the model's ability in correctly classifying the test set, namely test accuracy, as our rst evaluation metric. For backdoor-based watermarking schemes, we investigate the three watermark constructions i) Content Embedded, ii) Pre-Speci ed Noise, and iii) Abstract Images as described in 3.1. We explain [44] and [16] ), MModel rst takes a subset of the training data with labels equally distributed over all classes to form the watermark set. We point to the rest of the training set as the remaining training set. Subsequently, MModel embeds a content in the form of a text (TEST) inside a 26x10 square in all images in the watermark set. e watermark's position is xed but initially selected randomly, the corresponding label of the watermark set is also selected randomly among the L valid labels of the training set. Fig. 7 (a) shows a sample of the watermark set MModel generated for embedding content in MNIST data. To deploy Pre-speci ed Noise as the watermark( [44] ), MModel embeds an instance of Gaussian noise in the watermark set, as shown through a sample in Fig. 7 (b) . Selection of the watermark set for Pre-speci ed Noise is the same as the process in Content Embedded watermarking. However, in Abstract Images( [1] and [44] ), the watermark set is generated di erently. In this scheme, the watermark set is a set of abstract unrelated 100 images, as shown through an example in Fig. 7 (c) , additional to the training data. is watermark set in Abstract Images is then, unlike the previous two watermark sets, divided into L trigger sets and each set is mapped to a distinct label. A er forming the watermark set for the watermarking scheme, MModel generates the watermark modelM. To do so, MModel trains a modelM with a portion the of the watermark set and a portion of the remaining training set. Note that the rest of the two sets is needed to form test set and watermark test set. We evaluate the modelM, by capturing its ability in correctly classifying the test set, namely test accuracy and its ability in correctly recognizing the watermark and classifying it according to the pre-de ned label in the watermark test set, namely watermark retention.
Attack Algorithm A and GeneratingM-In both our blackbox and white-box a acks, the algorithm A aims to derive a model M that keeps the same test accuracy as the original model M, while it reduces the watermark retention to 1 
|L |
, where |L| is the total number of valid classes.
is reduction, shows that the model associates the watermarked input to the pre-de ned class, not more than a random classi er would do, hence indicating success in removing the watermark fully. To generateM, neither of our a acks use the original model M's training data with the ground truth labels, nor any of the watermarking information. Instead, they both query the watermark modelM with inputs from the publicly known domain ofM. Provided with the corresponding labels bŷ M, the a acker trainsM. e modelM is initiated with random weights when trained during the black-box a ack, but is initiated with the weights ofM in the white-box a ack.
ere are more details in trainingM during white-box a ack. A erM is initiated with the parameters ofM, it undergoes a regularization process and then is ne-tuned with the inputs from the publicly known domain ofM.
Data Sets for Experiments-We evaluate our a acks over two popular data sets in DNN literature: MNIST and CIFAR-10. MNIST has 60K training images and 10K test images. Cifar has 50K training images and 10K test images. We split the training data in half for the a acker and owner. Our mini-batches contain 64 elements and we use the SGD-based optimizing strategy RMSProp [3] with learning rate of 0.001. While training any model, we use Early Stopping [3] on the training accuracy with a min-delta of 0.1% and a patience of 2. For the white-box a ack we use early stopping on the watermark retention with a baseline of 0.1 a patience of 2 for Embedded Content and Pre-speci ed Noise watermarking schemes and 0 for Abstract Images. We use 0-1 normalization [3] for all datasets.
Security and Performance Evaluation-In what follows, we present our black-box and white-box a ack with concrete parameters in their setup and evaluation. As mentioned earlier in this section, our security evaluation metrics are: test accuracy and watermark retention. Test accuracy, is model' ability to correctly classify unseen input. Similarly, watermark retention is the model's ability to classify a marked input into pre-de ned labels. We also evaluate the performance of our a acks, based on the time they take to run rather than the number of epochs. As the la er is depends on the model while the former is independent of it.
Results
We present the results of our experiments black-box a ack on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 respectively. For both data sets, we evaluate our a acks on each of the three watermarking schemes described in 3.3, namely: Embedded Content (a, b), Pre-speci ed Noise (c, d) and Abstract Images (e, f ). e subgures (a), (c) and (e) depict the black-box a ack results, and the sub gures (b), (d) and (f ) indicate the white-box a ack results on the corresponding data set. Each graph evaluates the models generated by algorithm MModel followed by A's evaluations, where the former represents the owner's watermarked model and the la er represents the a acker's model. Note that to have fair evaluations we use the same network architecture for MModel and A. e evaluation metrics in our experiments are test accuracy and watermark retention. While both schemes desire a good test accuracy, in watermark retention they have opposite goals. e goal of the owner's model is to keep the watermark retention as close as possible to 1, whereas the a acker's model aims to remove the watermark fully, hence desiring a watermark retention that represents a value no more than a random label assignment algorithm would do, i.e. 1 L . As shown in black-box a ack graphs, (a), (c) and (e), the a acker A starts training its modelM, when MModel is done training the watermark modelM. A initiates training from random weights and queriesM for labeling its input to train the model a erwards.
e graphs indicate how long the black-box a ack takes to trainM compared to the time MModel needs to spend to trainM. In both models, the training continues until its test accuracy is stable at a desired level. For the white-box a ack on the other hand, sub gures (b), (d) and (f ), A initiates the algorithm from MModel parameters in addition to requiringM labeling its inputs. A rst goes through a regularization phase over a fraction of training data forM that takes a short time compared to the model's training time. As perceived from the graphs, A continues regularization until the watermark retention reaches a low level. A erwards, A applies a ne-tuning algorithm over the rest ofM's training data to compensate for the drop in test accuracy. e ne-tuning continues untilM hits a stable interval that is ϵ-close to theM s test accuracy. Our black-box a ack applied to models with watermarking schemes of Embedded Content, Pre-speci ed Noise, and Abstract Images on MNIST data, Fig. 8(a), (c) , (e) respectively, reduces the watermark retention is successfully from nearly 100% in the watermarked modelM to less than 10%(9.6%, 8.5%, 8.6%) while it causes a negligible drop in test accuracy(0.3%, 0.2%, 0.3%). e performance of the a ack is comparable to the performance of the watermarked model(since we do not consider the extensive data preparation step for the watermarked model). e watermarked model takes 3.5, 2.6 and 2.6 minutes to train with the three mentioned watermarking schemes embedded, whilst our black-box a ack takes 3.6, 4.1 and 5 minutes correspondingly to remove the watermark. e white-box a ack graphs in Fig. 8(b) , (d), (f) demonstrate signi cant speed-up compared to the black-box results. To remove the watermark while reaching the same test accuracy as our black-box a ack, the white-box a ack takes only 0.59, 0.77 and 2.1 minutes. However, we noticed that by continuing training the model in the white-box a ack for a total time of 3.3, 3, 3.8 minutes for each watermarking scheme, we can even reach higher test accuracy values, i.e. 0.1% drop compared to the watermark modelM. We evaluated our a acks on CIFAR-10 data as well. Fig. 9 results achieved by our white-box a ack. e results show that our black-box a ack reduces the watermark retention from nearly 100% in the watermarked modelM to 8.1%, 3.4%, and 20% inM. e training time forM is 166, 178 and 112 minutes, whereas it takes the black-box a ack 244, 208, and 158 minutes to trainM. e required time could signi cantly be dropped to 20, 20, and 33 minutes by our white-box a ack for the same accuracy. However, aiming for higher accuracy is also possible through our white-box a ack since it results in 1%, 0.4%, and 0.9% test accuracy if it is permi ed to train for 150, 123, and 190 minutes for each watermarking scheme.
Property Inference Attack-We investigated the e ectiveness of our property inference a ack to distinguish watermarked models from unmarked ones as shown in Fig. 10 (a) and (b) . In (a) we trained a two-layer model M P I by using 294 watermarked and unmarked models. e watermarked models were marked using Embedded Content method, and the tested M P I on 33 models and the result is shown in Fig. 10 . e network classi es watermarked and unmarked models perfectly a er only 50 seconds of training. We repeated the experiment on models with Pre-speci ed Noise watermarking in (b). A er training for 3.5 seconds with 113 watermarked and unmarked models, our 2-layer model performs perfect classication. We leave further investigation of the probable reasons to the discussion.
Discussion
We provide further analysis of our a acks here and compare our work with the only other a ack to backdoor-based watermarking schemes. We as well investigate deeper and present evidences that backdoor watermarking the model contradicts it achieving higher classi cation accuracy.
Full Removal of Watermark-As de ned in Section 4, full watermark removal is achieved if the following two conditions are satis ed
L |T | ≤ ϵ |T | Our black-box a ack removes the watermark with maximum ϵ = 0% and ϵ = 20% for MNIST and CIFAR-10 respectively, with corresponding test accuracy drop ofM compared toM is at maximum 0.3% and 3.7%. e a ack takes up to almost twice as much time as the watermarked model training. We demonstrated the results of our black-box a ack in combination with our proposed white-box a ack. e white-box a ack introduces two advantages over the black-box one. First, it removes the watermark while achieving the same accuracy as the black-box a ack in considerably shorter time. It does so with maximum ϵ = 1.4% for MNIST and ϵ = 13% for CIFAR-10. Second, it can achieve higher accuracy(0.1% drop for MNIST and 1% drop for CIFAR) if trained for longer.
Comparison with Evasion attack-ere has been just one other a ack in DNN watermarking literature to remove backdoors [20] , which steals n models and collects responses from all of them for each query. It then selects the answer that receives a higher vote among the responds from the stolen networks, and provides that as API prediction. e evasion a ack has various disadvantages. First, it relies on accessing n models that perform the same task. It is also introduced as an online a ack which requires availability of all n models for API prediction. Finally, it does not support any upgrade. In contrast, our a ack does not require access to multiple networks to a ack a watermarked network. We just query the target model for limited number of times, until we train our substitute model. Moreover, our substitute model can adapt to a more optimized version if it acquires more information, i.e. the watermarked model's parameters.
Watermark retention and test accuracy-In addition to the successful watermark removal by our a acks, we observed another important result in our experiments. As depicted in Fig. 11 for both MNIST and CIFAR-10 data sets in (a) and (b), our a acks on watermarked modelM reach lower watermark retention ifM achieves higher test accuracy. e reason is, the watermarked modelM is the reference forM's learning. IfM does not achieve high accuracy, the inadequacy transfers toM as well. Subsequently side factors would play a more important role in classifying the watermark test rather than the accurate model. We give an example of these "side factors" to clarify our argument. Considering the Content Embedded watermarking scheme, we know that the all elements in the watermark set, which has the size of 10% of the training data, are mapped to a pre-de ned xed class, e.g. class is 2. On the other hand, in classifying the rest of the training data we expect a balanced coverage of the labels, i.e. each label is mapped to approximately 10% of the training data. Now, the class 2 is mapped to 20% of the training data in total, resulting in an overall unbalanced class coverage. As a result, if a modelM trained on this data is not accurate enough, it will carry the bias in classi cations and transfers the bias to the subsequent network, M as well. erefore,M is more resistant to watermark removal. Hence, what is implied in this observation is for a model to maintain higher watermark retention, it is encouraged to provide lower classi cation accuracy.
is inherent contradiction impedes the backdoor-based watermarking schemes to ful ll their claim on the possibility of maintaining a high test accuracy and watermark retention at the same time.
Property Inference Attack-We demonstrated earlier that our property inference a ack is capable of distinguishing the presence of a watermark in a given network. We provide further evidences in Fig. 12 to present the rational behind it. Fig. 12 indicates feature vectors for watermarked models(dashed line) and unmarked models(solid line). Fig. 12 (a) shows the weight average in the rst layer of networks watermarked by Embedded Content approach and their di erence with the weight averages of an unmarked model. As well, Fig. 12 (b) indicates the di erence in the rst layer biases of unmarked models and models watermarked with Pre-speci ed Noise. Adding the capability of detecting watermarks empowers our black-box and white-box a acks even more. First, for it enables them to target only the watermarked models. Second, it helps the attacks to perform more e ciently and accurately by providing them with a tool to distinguish the stopping point, instead of continuing training blindly for a xed period of time.
CONCLUSION
We presented three a acks on the recent backdoor-based watermarking schemes in deep neural networks; black-box a ack, whitebox a ack, and property inference a ack. e targeted schemes deploy the model's watermark in one the form of: logo devised by an embedded content, pre-speci ed noise pa ern or trigger set consisting of abstract images. Our black-box and white-box a acks neither requires information about the type of embedded watermark, nor they need access to the ground truth function of the watermarked model, saving on enormous amount of time and resources required to prepare the training data. Instead, our a acks solely rely on the results of querying the watermarked model to label arbitrary inputs from the publicly known domain of the watermarked model. We should as well mention that since the total number of queries in either of our a acks in only 20, 000 − 30, 000, it is di cult for the watermarked model to rely on approaches such as rate limiting to defend against them. We show that our a acks successfully remove the model watermark completely, with no sacri ce on classi cation accuracy of the model. Our black-box approach, is a surrogate model a ack that accomplishes the full watermark removal task while knowing none of the watermarked model parameter and by solely exploiting its publicly available information. Although we show that granting more information, e.g. watermark model's parameters, facilitates devising a more optimized a ack. We introduced our white-box a ack in this work which consists of regularization and ne-tuning processes and improves the black-box a ack's performance noticeably. In addition to our two watermark removal a acks, we proposed a property inference a ack that can distinguish a watermarked model from an unmarked one. is a ack provides us with a powerful tool, to rst recognize watermarked models and then apply our black-box or white-box a acks on. Second, it bene ts our a acks by con rming when the watermark is fully removed and allows se ing an accurate stop time to further improve our a acks' e ciency.
